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Abstract
Detecting prohibited items in X-ray security imagery is pivotal in maintaining bor-
der and transport security against a wide range of threat profiles. Convolutional Neural
Networks (CNN) with the support of a significant volume of data have brought advance-
ment in such automated prohibited object detection and classification. However, collating
such large volumes of X-ray security imagery remains a significant challenge. This work
opens up the possibility of using synthetically composed imagery, avoiding the need to
collate such large volumes of hand-annotated real-world imagery. Here we investigate
the difference in detection performance achieved using real and synthetic X-ray train-
ing imagery for CNN architecture detecting three exemplar prohibited items,
{
Firearm,
Firearm Parts, Knives
}
, within cluttered and complex X-ray security baggage imagery.
We achieve 0.88 of mean average precision (mAP) with a Faster R-CNN and ResNet101
CNN architecture for this 3-class object detection using real X-ray imagery. While the
performance is comparable with synthetically composited X-ray imagery (0.78 mAP),
our extended evaluation demonstrates both challenge and promise of using synthetically
composed images to diversify the X-ray security training imagery for automated detec-
tion algorithm training.
1 Introduction
To ensure transport and border security, X-ray security screening is commonplace within
public transport and border security installations such as airports, railway and metro stations.
However, due to the nature of cluttered and complex X-ray imagery (Figure 1), the process of
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X-ray screening is complicated by tightly packed items within baggage making it challenging
and time-consuming to identify the presence of prohibited items. With the natural occurrence
of such prohibited items being rare, previous studies cite time constraints as a major factor
in the performance limitations of human operators for this screening task [3, 25].
A B C
Figure 1: Exemplar X-ray security baggage images with prohibited objects - red box: (A)
Firearm (B) Firearm Parts and (C) Knife.
Whilst challenging for a human, a reliable automatic prohibited item detection system
may assist in improving the performance and throughput of such screening processes [27].
To date, contemporary X-ray security scanners already implement material discrimination
via dual-energy multiple view X-ray imagery to enable threat material detection [18]. This
use of dual-energy X-ray gives rise to the false-colour mapped appearance of X-ray security
imagery (e.g., metals, alloy or hard plastic are shown in blue while less dense objects are
shown in green/orange - see Figure 1).
Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) based methods have proven effective in detecting
a wide range of object classes within this context [8, 10, 21, 26]. However, the performance
of such object detection approaches is heavily reliant on the availability of a substantial
volume of labelled X-ray imagery. Unfortunately, the availability of such X-ray imagery
datasets suitable for training CNN architectures is limited and also restricted in size and item
coverage (e.g. GDXray [14], SIXray [17]).
Commonly, it is challenging to collect sufficient X-ray imagery containing example of
prohibited items with large variations in pose, scale and item construction. To overcome
this challenge, contemporary data augmentation schemes such as image translation, rota-
tion, flipping and re-scaling are applied to enlarge the availability of otherwise limited train-
ing datasets [10]. However, such methods suffer from the fact that the resulting augmented
dataset still lacks diversity in terms of prohibited item variation and inter-occlusion emplace-
ment within complex and cluttered X-ray security imagery. This motivates the use of syn-
thetically composed imagery, where such imagery readily enables the introduction of more
variability in pose, scale and prohibited item usage in an efficient and readily available way.
In this work, we devise a Synthetically Composited (SC) data augmentation approach via
the use of Threat Image Projection (TIP). TIP is an established process within operational
aviation security for the monitoring of human operators which uses a smaller collection of
X-ray imagery comprising of isolated prohibited objects (only), which are subsequently su-
perimposed onto more readily available benign X-ray security imagery. Here this approach
additionally facilitates the generation of synthetic, yet realistic prohibited X-ray security im-
agery for the purpose of CNN training. Our key contributions are the following: (a) the
synthesis of high quality prohibited images from benign X-ray imagery using a documented
TIP approach and (b) an extended comparative evaluation on how real and synthetically
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generated X-ray imagery impacts the performance for prohibited object detection and clas-
sification using CNN architectures.
2 Related Work
Traditional computer vision methods that rely on handcrafted features have been applied to
prohibited item detection in X-ray security imagery such as Bag of Visual Words (BoVW)
[11, 13, 27] and sparse representations [15]. However, the recent advancement in CNN
have drawn more attention to prohibited item detection due to significant performance gains
within X-ray security imagery [1, 2, 16]. The works of [1, 16] compare handcrafted fea-
tures with a BoVW based sparse representation to CNN features. These shows that such
deep CNN features achieve superior performance with more than 95% accuracy for pro-
hibited item detection. The study of [1] exhaustively compares various CNN architectures
to evaluate the impact of network complexity on overall performance. Fine tuning the en-
tire network architecture for this problem domain yields 0.99% true positive, 0.01% false
positive and 0.994% accuracy for generalized prohibited item detection [1].
Further work on prohibited item under X-ray security imagery is undertaken by Mery
et al. [13], where regions of interest detection is performed across multiple views of the
object. Subsequently, the candidate region obtained from an earlier segmentation step is
then matched based on their similarity. This achieves 94.3% true positive and 5.6% false
positive across multiple view X-ray security imagery. The work of [2] examines the relative
performance of traditional sliding window driven CNN detection model based on [1] against
contemporary region-based and single forward-pass based CNN variants such as Faster R-
CNN [21], R-FCN [4], and YOLOv2 [20], achieving a maximal 0.88 and 0.97 mAP over
6-class object detection and 2-class firearm detection problems respectively.
To investigate the generalised applicability of CNN within X-ray security imagery, large
X-ray imagery datasets are required. Existing public domain datasets such as GDXray [14]
contains three major categories of prohibited items, {Guns, Shurikens, Razor blades}. How-
ever, images in GDXray are provided with lesser clutter and overlap making object detection
less challenging than in typical operational conditions. By contrast, the SIXray dataset [17]
contains six classes, {Guns, Knives, Wrenches, Pliers, Scissors, Hammers}, from cluttered
operational imagery. This provides more inter-occluding imagery examples but at the same
time provides significantly fewer prohibited item than benign samples akin to an opera-
tional (real-world) scenario, where the presence of prohibited items is low within stream-of-
commerce (largely benign) X-ray security imagery.
To overcome the limited dataset availability, data augmentation has been used to increase
overall dataset diversity. Whilst simple image data augmentation strategies such as transla-
tions, flipping and scaling do increase geometric diversity of the imagery they do not increase
the appearance or content diversity of the dataset itself [5]. The work of [30] alternatively
attempts data augmentation based on an Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) approach
but generates synthetic prohibited items in isolation rather than within a full cluttered X-ray
security image. By contrast, the work of [9] utilises an approach, similar to the concept of
TIP, whereby a prohibited item is superimposed into X-ray security imagery. Therefore, in
this work, we explore the feasibility of TIP as a data augmentation strategy to support per-
formance enhancement and evaluation of contemporary deep CNN architectures within the
context of prohibited item detection in security X-ray imagery.
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3 Proposed Approach
We investigate the use of a full TIP pipeline, based on prior work in the field [19, 23, 24],
to generate a range of appearance and contents based dataset variation (Section 3.1). Sub-
sequently, CNN object detection architecture is used to evaluate the TIP based data aug-
mentation approach and compare the performance with real X-ray security imagery (Section
3.2)
3.1 Synthetic X-ray Security Imagery via TIP
Our TIP pipeline consists of three components: threat image transformation, insertion posi-
tion determination and image compositing as illustrated in Figure 2.
Image compositing
( α=0.9, T )
Insertion Position
determination
Threat signature 
transformation
Figure 2: Threat image projection (TIP) pipeline for synthetically composited image gener-
ation.
We use threat (prohibited item) images containing clean, isolated object signatures which
can be easily segmented from their plain background via simple thresholding. To diversify
the resultant synthetic images, we apply threat image transformation via rotating the threat
signature by a random angle θ . Although other threat image transformation strategies (e.g.,
noise, illumination, magnification, etc.) have been explored in [22], our work focuses on
the pure combination of our segmented threat signature and a benign X-ray security image,
isolating the effects of other data augmentation techniques. We denote this transformed
threat image as Is and the i-th row, j-th column pixel as Is(i, j).
A valid insertion position within the bag image is determined based on the bag region
and the shape of threat signature. Given a bag image It , we use morphological operations to
extract the bag region. Specifically, the original bag image is firstly binarised by thresholding
(Figure 3b) to extract the foreground (target) region for insertion. Due to noise, a simple
thresholding process cannot ideally separate background and foreground. We sequentially
apply a series of appropriately parameterised morphological operations including dilation
(Figure 3c), hole filling (Figure 3d) and erosion (Figure 3e) to identify the largest connected
image region as the target for insertion (see Figure 3f). Obviously, a valid insertion of the
threat signature has to guarantee the threat signature is completely located inside this target
region. To this end, we use a loop to generate a random insertion position until it is a valid
one. The selected valid insertion position can be denoted by a binary mask matrix M of the
same size as the target baggage image with elements of ones indicating the insertion region.
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(a) Grayscale (b) Binarisation (c) Dilation (d) Hole filling (e) Erosion (f) Biggest region
Figure 3: Image segmentation using morphological operations for insertion position deter-
mination.
Finally, a threat signature Is is superimposed onto the target bag image It in the selected
valid position (denoted by M) to generate a synthetically composited image IT IP. To ensure
the plausibility of the composited TIP image, we consider two factors in image blend. Pa-
rameter α controls the transparency of the source image Is (α = 0.9). The other parameter
is the threat threshold T ensuring the consistency of source image with the target image in
terms of image contrast. The use of threat threshold T aims to remove the high-value pixels
of the threat signature so that the inserted threat signature is not visually too bright com-
paring against the target region where it is superimposed. To calculate the value of T , we
first transform the target image It to a greyscale image Gt . The threat threshold T can be
empirically calculated by:
T = min(exp(gˆ5)−0.5,0.95) (1)
where gˆ is the normalised average intensity of the insertion region within Gt calculated as:
gˆ =
∑i, j Gt(i, j)∗M(i, j)
∑i, j 255∗M(i, j)
∈ [0,1] (2)
The image compositing can be formulated as follows:
IT IP(i, j) =
{
(1−α)It(i, j)+αIs(i′, j′), M(i, j) = 1 and Is(i′, j′)< T ∗255,
It(i, j), otherwise
(3)
where I(i, j) denotes the value of pixel in i-th row and j-th column of the image I; Is(i′, j′)
denotes the pixel in source image corresponding to the pixel of I(i, j). Since the value of T
computed by Eq.(1) is in the range of 0.5-0.95, any pixel of the higher value than T ∗255 in
the source image will be ignored during image compositing process.
The proposed TIP approach is able to generate a large number of diverse synthetic X-
ray baggage images containing prohibited items whose locations are accessible without any
extra cost for training a supervised learning detection model.
3.2 Detection Strategies
We use two representative CNN object detection model, Faster R-CNN [21] and RetinaNet
[12], for the purposes of our evaluation.
Faster R-CNN [21] is an object detection algorithm which is the combination of its pre-
decessor Fast R-CNN [6] and Region Proposal Network (RPN). Unlike Fast R-CNN [6],
which utilises external region proposal, this architecture has its own region proposal net-
work, which is consists of convolutional layers that generate object proposals and two fully
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connected layers that predict coordinates of bounding boxes. The corresponding locations
and bounding boxes are then fed into objectness classification and bounding box regression
layers. Finally the objectness classification layer classify whether a given region proposal
is an object or a background region while a bounding box regression layer predicts object
localisation, at the end of the overall detection process.
RetinaNet [12] is an object detector where the key idea is to solve the extreme class imbal-
ance between foreground and background classes. To improve the performance, RetinaNet
employs a novel loss function called Focal Loss, where it modifies the cross-entropy loss
such that it down-weights the loss in easy negative samples so that the loss is focusing on
the sparse set of hard samples. Unlike Faster R-CNN [21] which apply two-stage approach,
RetinaNet only apply one-stage approach, potentially to be faster and simpler.
4 Experimental Setup
Our experimental setup comprises of real X-ray security imagery dataset and one constructed
using the TIP based synthetic compositing approach outlined in Section 3.1. These are eval-
uated within a common CNN training environment using the CNN architecture outlined in
Section 3.2.
A B
Figure 4: Visual comparison of real (A) and SC
(B) X-ray security imagery of prohibited items.
Dbf3Real dataset: The Durham Dataset
Full Three-class (Dbf3) images are gen-
erated using a Smith Detection dual-
energy X-ray scanner (Figure. 1). It
consists of total 7,603 images, which
is divided into three classes of prohib-
ited item. In this experiment we uses
subsets of the datasets, which consists
of three types metallic prohibited item,
{Firearm, Firearm Parts, Knives}. Out
of these three classes, we incorporate
3,192 images of firearms, 1,204 images
of firearms parts, and 3,207 images of knives, within cluttered and complex X-ray security
dataset.
Dbf3SC dataset: The Synthetically Composited (SC) dataset is generated using TIP ap-
proach of Section 3.1. We use 3,366 benign X-ray security images, generated by a Smith
Detection X-ray scanner, and 123 individual prohibited objects of three classes {Firearm,
Firearm Parts, Knives}. The prohibited item are composed into the benign images to create
synthetically composited X-ray security imagery dataset. We use the same number of im-
ages as Dbf3Real in the synthetically composited dataset. Exemplar images from Dbf3Real
(Figure. 4A) and Dbf3SC (Figure 4B) are visually realistic and challenging to distinguish
from the real images.
Dbf3Real+SC dataset: A subset of Dbf3Real and subset of Dbf3SC images are combined to
create this dataset, where the numbers of synthetic and real images are are used in equal
number to present a data set with 50% of each which is itself the same size as Dbf3Real .
The CNN architecture (Section 3.2) are trained on a GTX 1080Ti GPU, optimised by
Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) with a weight decay of 0.0001, learning rate of 0.01
and termination at maximum of 180k epochs. ResNet50 and ResNet101 are chosen as net-
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work backbone to operate within the detection framework of [7]. We split each dataset into
training (60%), validation (20%) and test sets (20%) so that each split has similar class dis-
tribution. All CNN architecture are initialised with ImageNet [10] pre-trained weights for
their respective model [29].
5 Evaluation
Our evaluation considers the comparative performance of CNN architecture to detect prohib-
ited items using real X-ray imagery against prohibited items under synthetic X-ray imagery.
We consider mean Average Precision (mAP) as our evaluation criteria following [2].
5.1 Prohibited Item Detection Results
In the first set of experiments (Table 1, upper), prohibited items in X-ray security imagery
are detected using the CNN architectures set out in Section 3.2. We use the Dbf3 dataset
consisting of three types of prohibited items {Firearm, Firearm Parts, Knives}. To provide
performance benchmark, our CNN architectures are firstly trained and evaluated on real im-
ages of Dbf3 (Dbf3Real ⇒ Dbf3Real). The AP/mAP highlighted in Table 1(upper) denotes the
maximal performance achieved. Table 1 shows statistical results of prohibited item detec-
tion for Faster R-CNN [21] and RetinaNet [12] architecture using ResNet50 and ResNet101.
Inline with the overall complexity of the network, we observe maximal mAP performance
from ResNet101 for all three prohibited item classes. In this performance benchmark, we
observe that the best performance (mAP = 0.88) is achieved on Dbf3real by Faster R-CNN
with ResNet101 configuration, as presented in Table 1 (upper).
Train⇒
Evaluation Model Network
Average precision mAPFirearm Firearm Parts Knives
Dbf3Real ⇒
Dbf3Real
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.87 0.84 0.76 0.82
ResNet101 0.91 0.88 0.85 0.88
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.88 0.86 0.73 0.82
ResNet101 0.89 0.86 0.73 0.83
Dbf3SC ⇒
Dbf3Real
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.82 0.77 0.55 0.71
ResNet101 0.86 0.80 0.66 0.78
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.84 0.77 0.53 0.71
ResNet101 0.84 0.76 0.54 0.72
Dbf3Real+SC ⇒
Dbf3Real
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.85 0.79 0.65 0.76
ResNet101 0.87 0.81 0.74 0.81
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.85 0.81 0.64 0.76
ResNet101 0.86 0.80 0.63 0.76
Table 1: Detection results of varying CNN architecture trained on: Upper→ Dbf3Real , Mid-
dle → Dbf3SC and Lower → Dbf3Real+SC. All models are evaluated on set of real X-ray
security imagery.
In second set of experiments (Table 1, middle), the CNN architecture are trained on the
synthetic X-ray imagery (Dbf3SC) achieve 0.78 mAP when tested on same set of real X-ray
imagery (Dbf3Real) of Table 1 (upper). Even though the performance is lesser when com-
pared with former results (Table 1, upper), this experimental setting does not require any
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manual image labelling (as TIP insertion positions are known) and yet achieves surprisingly
good performance on a standard benchmark. The performance gap between CNN architec-
ture trained on real and synthetically composited X-ray imagery is attributable to the domain
shift problem whereby the distribution of training and test data differ. In the first experi-
ment (Table 1, upper), the training and test data are from the same distribution since they
are created by randomly dividing data captured under the same experimental conditions. By
contrast, in this second experimental setup (Table 1, middle), the prohibited items used for
the synthetic X-ray imagery (Dbf3SC) data are different from those in the test X-ray imagery
(Dbf3Real) data. It is also noteworthy that prohibited images used for generating synthetic
X-ray imagery (Dbf3SC) data is a smaller set of prohibited item instances than in the real
training images. As a result, CNN architecture trained on synthetic data have larger gen-
eralisation errors than those trained on real data. However, when tested on synthetic X-ray
imagery (Dbf3SC) data (Table 2), however, CNN architecture trained with real or synthetic
CNN architecture have comparable performance. These experimental results show that it is
essential to have diverse prohibited item signatures in the training data to improve the gen-
eralisation. It also largely explains why overall performance in Table 2 (showing evaluation
on the synthetic dataset, Dbf3SC) is significantly higher than overall performance in Table 1
(evaluation is on the real dataset, Dbf3Real).
Train⇒
Evaluation Model Network
Average precision mAPFirearm Firearm Parts Knives
Dbf3Real ⇒
Dbf3SC
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.87
ResNet101 0.92 0.92 0.89 0.91
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.89 0.87 0.83 0.86
ResNet101 0.90 0.88 0.85 0.88
Dbf3SC ⇒
Dbf3SC
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.90 0.88 0.83 0.87
ResNet101 0.93 0.92 0.86 0.91
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.91 0.89 0.84 0.88
ResNet101 0.91 0.89 0.83 0.86
Dbf3Real+SC ⇒
Dbf3SC
Faster
R-CNN [21]
ResNet50 0.89 0. 86 0.83 0.86
ResNet101 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.89
RetinaNet [12]
ResNet50 0.90 0.87 0.83 0.87
ResNet101 0.90 0.88 0.84 0.87
Table 2: Detection results of different CNN architecture trained on: Upper → Dbf3Real ,
Middle→ Dbf3SC and Lower→ Dbf3Real+SC. All models are evaluated on set of SC dataset.
In the third set of experiments (Table 1, bottom), we evaluate the effectiveness of syn-
thetic X-ray imagery by combining it with real images of Dbf3 to create Dbf3Real+SC dataset,
as explained in the Section 4. We evaluate the testing sets of images from real Dbf3 (Table
1) and synthetically composite (Table 2) datasets. Surprisingly, the combination of real and
synthetic imagery data does not improve the results (e.g. 0.81 vs 0.88 on Db f 3Real and 0.89
vs 0.91 on Db f 3SC with Faster R-CNN and ResNet101). This can also be explained by the
domain shift problem mentioned previously. Possibly this data combination can perform
well if we apply domain adaptation techniques [28] explicitly. In addition, we may also need
to evaluate the quality of the TIP solution that underpins our work further.
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5.2 Qualitative Examples
Exemplar prohibited items detection results from Faster R-CNN [21] with ResNet101 are de-
picted in Figure 5, using real (top row) and synthetic (bottom row) training imagery. These
results illustrate that the synthetically composited imagery using TIP techniques can be ef-
fective in training detection architectures for prohibited item detection in cluttered X-ray
security imagery.
A
B
Figure 5: Exemplar detection of prohibited items in red box using Faster R-CNN [21] and
trained on (A) Dbf3Real and (B) Dbf3SC images.
We also visually inspect the detection results to investigate the performance difference
when training the models using real and synthetic data. By comparing the results depicted in
Figures 6A1 and 6B1, the model trained with synthetic data fails to detect the knives since
such type of knives have very different appearance from the ones we used to generate the
synthetic imagery. On the other hand, from Figures 6A2 and 6B2 we can see that the model
trained on synthetic imagery has mistakenly detected something benign as a knife. These
results account for the low performance for knife detection observed in Table 1. As a result,
we need to either use more diverse threat signatures for data synthesis or particular domain
adaptation techniques to tackle the potential domain shift problem identified previously.
A1 B1 B2A2
Figure 6: Exemplar prohibited item detection (by Faster R-CNN [21]) using Dbf3Real
(A1,A2) and Dbf3SC (B1,B2) training datasets. Green dashed box in B1 fails to detect,
where in B2 wrongly detects as knife.
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6 Conclusion
This work explores the possibility of generating synthetically composite X-ray security im-
agery for training of CNN architecture to bypass the collecting a large amount of hand-
annotated real-world X-ray baggage imagery. We synthesise high-quality synthetically com-
posited X-ray images using TIP approach and we present an extensive comparison on how
real and synthetic X-ray security imagery affects the performance of CNN architecture for
prohibited object detection in cluttered X-ray baggage images. Our experimental compar-
ison demonstrates Faster R-CNN achieves the highest performance with mAP: 0.88 when
trained on Real data (the good), followed by Real+Synthetic (the bad) and Synthetic (the
ugly) over a three-class, {Firearms, Firearm parts, Knives}, prohibited item detection prob-
lem. This demonstrates a strong insight into the benefits of using real X-ray training data,
also challenge and promise of using synthetic X-ray imagery.
In our future work, it is worth further investigating how to improve the effectiveness of
synthetically composited imagery for training CNN architecture. Based on other work [30],
a potential direction is to generate more diverse prohibited items images using generative
adversarial networks (GAN). The generated prohibited item images then could be used for
generating synthetic baggage images using TIP or similar.
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